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Abstract
This paper presents progressivity breakdowns for Croatian personal income tax 
(henceforth PIT) in 1997 and 2004. The decompositions reveal how the elements of the 
system – tax schedule, allowances, deductions and credits – contribute to the achieve-
ment of progressivity, over the quantiles of pre-tax income distribution. Through the use of 
‘single parameter’ Gini indices, the social decision maker’s (henceforth SDM) relatively 
more or less favorable inclination toward taxpayers in the lower tails of pre-tax income 
distribution is accounted for. Simulations are undertaken to show how the introduction of 
a flat-rate system would affect progressivity.
Keywords: personal income tax, progressivity, decomposition
1 Introduction
The tax system is said to be progressive (proportional, regressive) when the marginal 
tax rate is greater than (equal to, less than) the average tax rate. Progressive (proportional, 
regressive) income tax system reduces (leaves unchanged, increases) income inequality. 
The interest in studying tax progressivity lies, among other things, in the welfare superi-
ority of progressive tax over the equal-yield proportional tax. In other words, the former 
implies a smaller welfare reduction than the latter for the same amount of tax collected. 
In this paper we deal with how different components of the PIT system contribute to the 
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achievement of overall progressivity. The methodology developed by Pfähler (1990) was 
later refined by Lambert (2001) and applied by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) in in-
vestigating the relative significance of various elements of the PIT system – tax sched-
ule, allowances, deductions and tax credits – in determination of final progressivity in 15 
OECD countries. The results showed that in some countries progressivity was derived al-
most solely from the tax schedule, allowances or tax credits, while in others some mix-
ture of these elements was present. Deductions proved to have a negative influence on 
progressivity in most countries. 
This paper presents the decomposition of progressivity for the Croatian PIT system 
in 1997 and 2004. Based on the above mentioned methodology, it introduces some nov-
elties in its application: progressivity component patterns are analyzed over quantiles of 
the relevant pre-tax income distributions, while through the use of ‘single parameter’ 
Gini indices, the social decision maker’s relatively more or less favorable inclination to-
ward taxpayers in the lower tails of the pre-tax income distribution is also accounted for. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the basic methodology underlying 
progressivity measurement is presented. Section 3 contains a short overview of Croatian 
PIT system development over the period from 1997 to 2004. It continues with the anal-
ysis of different progressivity effects and ends with a simulation of tax burdens, under-
taken to show how the introduction of a flat-rate system would affect PIT progressivity. 
Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Progressivity measures
Let LX (p) be the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income at quantile p. If income were equal-
ly distributed, each fraction p, of the population would have exactly p x100 percent of 
total pre-tax income.1 However, they receive LX (p) x100 percent of total pre-tax income, 
which is typically less than p x100 percent, and we may call the difference p – LX (p) an 
equality deficit. Analogously, we can define a Lorenz curve for post-tax income LN (p). 
Also, let CT (p) be the concentration curve for taxes and CN (p) the concentration curve 
for post-tax income.2
If the tax were proportional, each fraction p of the population would pay exactly LX 
(p) x100 percent of the total tax. However, they pay only CT (p) x100 percent of the tax 
(which is typically less). We may call the difference LX (p) – CT (p) a departure from pro-
portionality. In the words of Lambert (2001) “the distance LX (p) – CT (p) is that frac-
tion of the total tax burden shifted from low incomes (the bottom p x100 percent) by 
the presence of progression in the tax”. If (1–p) x100 percent) to high incomes (the top 
LX (p) ≥ CT (p) [LX (p) ≤ CT (p)] for all values of p, with strict inequality holding at least 
1 On measurement of income inequality and redistribution see Lambert (2001) and Duclos and Araar (2006).
2 Notice the difference between a) Lorenz curve, which shows a proportion of total sum of the variable K 
obtained by the p x100 percent of the population with the lowest values of K, and b) concentration curve, which 
shows a proportion of total sum of the variable L obtained by the p x100 percent of the population with the low-
est values of K.209
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somewhere, we say that the tax is progressive (regressive). This approach to measure-
ment yields what is called Tax-Redistribution (TR) progressivity (Pfähler, 1987). Thus, 
TR-progressivity of tax system measured at p-th quantile of the pre-tax income distri-
bution is equal to:
π
TR p () = LX p () −CT p ()  (1)
We also adopt another approach, what is called Income-Redistribution (IR) progres-
sivity. The p x100 percent of income units with the lowest pre-tax incomes own LX (p) 
x100 percent of total pre-tax income, but CN (p) x100 percent of total post-tax income 
(which is, typically, more). Therefore, CN(p) – LX (p) shows the fraction of total post-tax 
income earned by the poorest p x100 percent income earners above their share in post-
tax income that would occur under a proportional tax system. If CN (p) ≥ LX (p) [CN (p) ≤ 
LX (p)] for all values of p, with strict inequality holding at least somewhere, again we say 
that the tax is progressive (regressive). IR-progressivity of a tax system at the p-th quan-
tile of pre-tax income distribution is equal to:
π
IR p () = CN p () − LX p ()  (2)
There is an important relationship between IR-progressivity and TR-progressivity, 
first introduced and proved by Kakwani (1977a, 1977b):
π
IR p () =
t
1− t
π
TR p ()   (3a)
CN p () − LX p () =
t
1− t
LX p () −CT p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ (3b)
where t stands for average tax rate. Kakwani’s relationship tells us that a certain 
amount of income redistribution can be achieved either with higher TR-progressivity and 
a lower average tax rate, or vice versa. Assuming that the system is progressive and pre-
tax income does not change, a proportionate increase (or decrease) of tax liabilities, would 
not affect TR-progressivity but would affect IR-progressivity.3
2.2 Elements that cause progressivity
Let us now turn to the definition of the tax function. First, we define the tax base Bi 
of individual i as Bi = Xi – Ai –Di, where Ai represents individual i’s total tax allowances, 
and Di represents deductions. The gross tax Gi, is a (typically) piecewise linear function 
3 If the tax system does not rerank individuals in the transition from the pre-tax to the post-tax income distribu-
tion, the concentration curve and Lorenz curve for post-tax income will coincide. However, in practice this is rarely 
the case, and therefore we also need to measure the reranking effect,  RR (p) = CN (p) − LN (p), as the departure from 
a horizontally neutral tax system, which can also be interpreted as a loss of potential redistribution. Finally, we can 
define the redistributive effect,  RE (p) = LN (p) − LX (p), which is comprehensive in the sense that it accounts both for 
potential redistribution and the loss due to reranking:  RE (p) =  IR (p) −  RR (p).210
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of the tax base (though not so in Germany). The net tax Ti, is obtained as Gi – Ci, where 
Ci denotes the tax credits of individual i. Allowances (A) include basic allowance and ad-
ditional allowances given according to the family-related or age-related characteristics of 
the taxpayer; in some countries they are also called ‘basic personal exemptions’. Deduc-
tions (D) include proportionate deductions of income and expenditure-related items, such 
as mortgage interest payments, insurances, charities, etc.
Analogously to IR-progressivity, we may define four different IR-effects, one for each 
of the above-mentioned elements:
a) the IR-progressivity of allowances,  A (p), measures disproportionality between the 
tax base X-A that would occur if only allowances existed (i.e. in the absence of deduc-
tions), and pre-tax income, X:
πA p () = CX −A p () − LX p () ≡
a
1− a
LX p () −CA p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ (4)
b) the IR-progressivity of deductions,  D (p), measures disproportionality between the 
tax base X-D that would occur if only deductions existed, and pre-tax income X:
πD p () = CX −D p () − LX p () ≡
d
1− d
LX p () −CD p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦  (5)
c) the IR-progressivity of the rate structure,  R (p), measures disproportionality be-
tween the actual tax base, reduced by gross tax (X-A-D-G), and tax base (X-A-D) itself:
πR p () = CX −A−D−G p () −CX −A−D p () ≡
g
1− a − d − g
CX −A−D p () −CG p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦   
  (6)
d) the IR-progressivity of tax credits,  C (p), measures disproportionality between pre-
tax income augmented by tax credits (X+C) and pre-tax income itself (X):
πC p () =− CX +C p () + LX p () ≡
c
1+ c
LX p () −CC p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦  (7)
Based on principles laid down by Pfähler (1990), Lambert (2001) developed a meth-
odology for breaking down TR- and IR-progressivity into components that explain the 
contributions of the rate schedule, allowances and deductions to overall progressivity. In 
this paper the decomposition of IR-progressivity will be used, extended to cover also tax 
credits. The decomposition formula is a weighted average of the progressivity terms de-
fined above:211
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π
IR p () =
g
1− g + c
b − g
g
πR p () −
1− a
b
πA p () −
1− d
b
πD p ()
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ −
1+ c
1− g + c
πC p ()
 
  (8)
where g, a, d, c and b are respectively the shares of gross tax, allowances, deduc-
tions, tax credits and the tax base in total pre-tax income X.4 For practical reasons, the 
terms  A (p), and  C (p), are replaced (in Lambert (2001), followed also by Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer (2001) by their negative counterparts, ρA (p) = – A (p) and ρC (p) = – C 
(p) which are respectively called “regressivities” of allowances and tax credits. Here we 
do the same, and (8) becomes:
π
IR p () =
g
1− g + c
b − g
g
πR p () +
1− a
b
ρA p () −
1− d
b
πD p ()
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ +
1+ c
1− g + c
ρC p ()
  
  (8b)
The first term on the right hand side of (8b) presents the contribution to IR-progres-
sivity of the gross tax liability, whereas the second term reveals the portion of progres-
sivity attributable to tax credits. Although they are obvious from equation (8b), for easier 
reference later we will now identify the following quantile measures, to describe the con-
tributions of the following four elements to overall IR-progressivity: the rate structure ef-
fect, the allowance effect, the deductions effect, and the tax credit effect (9):
ER
IR p () =
g
1− g + c
b − g
g
πR p () ,
 
EA
IR p () =
g
1− g + c
1− a
b
ρA p () ,
ED
IR p () =−
g
1− g + c
1− d
b
πD p () ,
  
EC
IR p () =
1+ c
1− g + c
ρC p ()  (9)
2.3 Inequality indices
So far, we have measured progressivity effects as distances between relevant Lorenz 
and concentration curves at different quantiles of the income distribution. To obtain ag-
gregate measures of progressivity, these distances can be summed up using any desired 
weighting scheme. One such scheme, w (p), gives different weights to distances occur-
ring at different quantiles of the distribution, thus expressing the ethical attitudes of the 
observer. This type of scheme, first proposed by Mehran (1976), gives us a family of lin-
ear inequality indices, I:
IX = p − LX p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
0
1
∫ wp () dp  (10)
4 Note that the average net tax rate, t, is equal to t = g - c. Throughout the text the term “average tax rate” is 
synonymous with “average net tax rate”.212
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The index in (10) represents inequality of pre-tax income. However, the term p – LX 
(p) in (10) can be replaced by any one of the rank differences mentioned above. In the 
analysis that follows, we concentrate on one special case, that of the so-called single pa-
rameter Gini indices of inequality by Donaldson and Weymark (1980), for which the 
weights are defined as follows:
wp () =κ p,ν () =ν ν−1 () 1− p ()
ν−2 ()  (11)
where ν ≥ 1. These weights are illustrated in Figure 1 for several values of the ethi-
cal parameter ν Observe several cases:
a) ν = 1 → κ p,ν () = 0  for every p → IX = 0 → no inequality is observed, whatever 
the distribution of incomes.
b) ν = 2 → κ p,ν () = 2  for every p → IX = GX, where GX represents the standard 
Gini coefficient.
c) 1 < ν < 2 → κ p,ν ()  is increasing in p, giving larger ethical weights to equality 
deficits felt at higher ps.
d) ν > 2 → κ p,ν ()  is decreasing in p, thus giving larger ethical weights to equality 
deficits felt at lower ps.
Our single parameter measure of inequality, or S-Gini coefficient for pre-tax income, 
is defined as follows:
GX ν () = p − LX p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
0
1
∫ κ p,ν () dp  (12)
Analogously to (12), from (1) and (2) we obtain the indices of TR- and IR-progres-
sivity:
π
TR ν () = LX p () −CT p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
0
1
∫ κ p,ν () dp, 
 
π
IR ν () = CN p () − LX p () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
0
1
∫ κ p,ν () dp
 (13)
Similarly, from (9) indices of the rate structure effect, E
IR
R   (ν), the allowance effect, E
IR
A 
(ν), deductions effect, E
IR
D   (ν) and tax credit effect, E
IR
C   (ν), are obtained. Henceforth, we 
refer to all of these indices, which are based upon the S-Gini index of income inequality, 
as S-indices (of progressivity and its components).5
5 Duclos and Tabi (1995) apply S-Gini indices for measuring distribution and redistribution of income in Canada.213
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Figure 1 Weights for calculation of single-parameter indices
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In the introduction it was said that progressivity is related to social welfare. Here we 
show that a progressive tax delivers more social welfare than an equal-yield proportion-
ate tax; or put differently, the progressive tax can collect more revenue for identical so-
cial welfare than a proportionate tax. Denote with WX, WN, WN
P,ETY and WN
P,ESWthe so-
cial welfare6 values associated with the pre-tax income distribution, post-tax income dis-
tribution, distribution of income after the equal-yield proportional income tax and distri-
bution of income after the proportional income tax that yields the same social welfare as 
actual post-tax income distribution.
WX =μ 1−GX [] , WN =μ 1− t () 1−GN [] , 
WN
P,ETY =μ 1− t () 1−GX [] , WN
P,ESW =μ 1− t
P,ESW () 1−GX []  (14)
where μ is the mean pre-tax income, t is actual average tax rate and tP, ESW is propor-
tional tax rate that would achieve the same social welfare as the actual post-tax income 
distribution. It can be seen (Lambert, 2001, and similarly in Duclos et al., 2003) that:
WN −WN
P,ETY =μ 1− t () π
IR  (15)
Thus, if income tax is progressive ( IR > 0), it will cause a smaller reduction of social 
welfare in the transition from pre-tax to post-tax income than an equal-yield proportional 
tax. We can express this welfare premium more suitably in terms of WN
P,ETY , and obtain 
the Blackorby-Donaldson index of inequality7:
6 See Appendix B on measurement of social welfare.
7 Blackorby and Donaldson (1984).214
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π
BD =
WN −WN
P,ETY
WN
P,ETY =
π
IR
1−GX
 (16)
Similarly, from (14) we can obtain an index of tax revenue premium8 ( TRP) that shows 
us, in terms of pre-tax income, how much more tax revenue can be collected due to pro-
gressivity compared to an identical-welfare proportional tax:
π
TRP = t − t
P,ESW =
1− t () π
IR
1−GX
 (17)
3 Analysis
3.1 Personal income tax in Croatia
New PIT legislation that replaced the system inherited from the ex-socialist state was 
introduced in 1994. The tax schedule consisted of two brackets, and the corresponding 
rates were 20% and 35%. Taxable income included wages and salaries, pensions, income 
from self-employment and rents. In 2001 there came several major changes: a) dividends 
were included into taxable income9; b) the use of separate schedules for some sorts of in-
come was allowed; c) a number of deductions and special allowances were introduced for 
certain groups of taxpayers. The tax schedule was also changed, to contain three brack-
ets, with corresponding tax rates of 15%, 25% and 35%. In 2003 new reliefs were intro-
duced, together with a fourth bracket with a rate of 45%. More detailed description of the 
system is given in Table 1.
Personal allowances consist of a basic allowance (BA), and an additional allow-
ance for dependents (DA). Throughout the whole period, BA grew faster than aver-
age income, and dependent allowance factors10 were also increased. A specific charac-
teristic of the PIT system in all years is that for pensioners a separate basic allowance 
was set, at a level almost twice as high as that of the general BA. The consequence is 
that only one in ten pensioners actually pay PIT; pensioners made up 33% (40%) of the 
whole population of PIT payers in 1997 (2004). Whereas they held 19% (27%) of total 
income, they contributed less than 2% of the total tax revenue in both years. Because of 
this dual treatment of taxpayers, and since a significant increase in the number of pen-
sioners occurred over the period due to early retirement, it was decided to perform sep-
arate analyses for two samples: one excluding pensioners, and another in which all tax-
payers are covered.
8 Created for purposes of subsequent analysis in this paper.
9 Dividends are excluded from taxation by the Law from 2005.
10 DA=k*BA, where k is the so-called ‘dependent allowance factor’. The value of k depends on the number of 
children and other dependent members of the family.215
I. Urban: Progressivity of personal income tax in Croatia: decomposition of tax base and rate effects
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (3), 207-231 (2006)
In the following analysis, under the term allowances (A) we consider the sum of 
BA and DA. Obligatory contributions to the social security funds are not a part of in-
come subject to taxation, and therefore they were not analyzed. Deductions (D) capture 
all other reliefs that reduce the tax base, shown in Table 1 under “other allowances and 
deductions” and “standardized costs”. Among tax credits (C), there was only one such 
relief, in 2004, but it was negligible in amount. The tax unit is the individual. For pur-
poses of comparability across years, income from dividends has been excluded from 
the analysis.11
Table 1 Basics of PIT system in Croatia
Personal allowance
1997
1  Basic: 9,600 kuna (all except pensioners); 24,000 kuna (pensioners)
2  For dependents: 2,900 kuna (one child); 6,700 kuna (two children); etc. 
2004
1  Basic: 18,000 kuna (all except pensioners); 30,600 kuna (pensioners)
2  For dependents: 7,560 kuna (one child); 18,180 kuna (two children); etc.
Other allowances and deductions
1997
none
2004
1    Premiums for life-, additional health- and voluntary pension insurance (up to 12,600 kuna)
2    Exemption for persons who carry out an artistic or cultural activity (up to 20,000 kuna)
3   Additional personal allowance for people living in ASNCa (15,000-30,000 kuna)
4    Exemption for self-employed who live in ASNC (25%, 50% or 75% of pre-tax income)
5    Employment incentives – wages of newly employed workers and apprentices
(limited by income)
6    Expenditures for research and development (limited by income)
7    Outlays made for education and skill-development of employees (limited by income)
8   Accelerated depreciation (limited by income)
9    Health protection and medical treatment outlays; health insurance (up to 12,000 kuna)
10    Dwelling acquisition or improvement costs; paid rent and mortgage (up to 12,000 kuna)
11    Gifts for cultural, educational, humanitarian and other purposes (up to 2% of total revenue)
Standardized costs
1997
1  Rental income: 30-50% of receipts
2004
1  Rental income: 30-50% of receipts
2  Income from part-time and contractual work: 25-55% of receipts
11 Dividends make about 2% of total pre-tax income in 2004, belonging exclusively to 10% top income-
earners.216
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Standard tax schedule
1997
0-28,800 kuna: 20%; >28,800 kuna: 35%
2004
0-36,000 kuna: 15%; 36,000- 81,000 kuna: 25%; 81,000-252,000: 35%; >252,000 kuna: 45%
Special tax schedulesb
1997
none
2004
1  Rental income: 15%
2  Income from part-time and contractual work: 35%
3  Royalties and income from sale of real estates: 35%
4 Dividends:  15%
Tax credits
1997
none
2004
1  Tax credits for war veterans
a ASNC – the areas of special national concern
b Final withholding
3.2 Data
As part of a research project on redistributional aspects of the Croatian personal in-
come tax and social security contributions, databases for personal income in 1997-2004 
have been compiled.12 They are 4.3-5% representative samples from the respective pop-
ulations of PIT payers, containing, for each taxpayer: gross income by source, social se-
curity contributions paid by the employee, personal income tax paid, and the amounts of 
allowances and deductions. The following analysis draws upon these databases, which, 
after (before) exclusion of pensioners, contained data for 68,552 (102,555) and 71,421 
(119,344) taxpayers in 1997 and 2004, respectively.
3.3 Progressivity and redistributive effect
Figure 2 shows TR- and IR-progressivity measures for Croatian PIT in 1997 and 2004, 
estimated at each percentile.13 Comparing the two figures, we observe opposing trends: 
while TR-progressivity is higher in 2004 for all quantiles above p=0.25, IR-progressivity 
is higher in 1997, for all p<0.92.
12 These micro data were compiled with the permission, help and support of the Tax Administration. 
13  Priority in presentation of results is given to the reduced sample (without pensioners), but a short compari-
son with the results obtained for the full sample is given at the end of this section. 217
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Figure 2 TR-progressivity and IR-progressivity by percentile
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What do the progressivity curves for 1997 and 2004 tell us? In the case of TR-pro-
gressivity, if the tax were proportional, the progressivity curve would coincide with the 
x-axis, because each quantile’s share in total tax would be equal to its share in pre-tax 
income. However, when the tax is progressive, the progressivity curve lies above the x-
axis. In 1997, for example, TR-progressivity at p=0.8 is equal to 0.187. If the share of 
the poorest 80% taxpayers in total pre-tax income were s%, under the proportional sys-
tem they would pay s% of total tax; instead, they pay (s–18.7)% of total tax. Progressiv-
ity elements of the PIT system thus shifted 18.7% of the total PIT burden from the poor-
est 80% taxpayers onto the shoulders of the richest 20%.14 The difference between 2004 
and 1997 TR-progressivity equals, for example, 0.093 at p=0.95. It means that in 2004 
the poorest 95% taxpayers shifted 9.3% of total PIT (of that year) more than in 1997 to 
the richest 5%. On the other hand, IR-progressivity tells us how a departure from pro-
portionality in taxation affects distribution of post-tax income. Again, if tax is progres-
sive, the IR-progressivity curve will lie above the x-axis. For example, in 1997 (2004), 
IR-progressivity at p=0.5 amounted to 0.021 (0.017). This means that the poorest half of 
taxpayers receive 2.1% (1.7%) more total post-tax income than they would receive under 
proportional taxation.
As equations (3a) and (3b) show, the two measures of progressivity are connected 
through the average tax rate. Increased concentration of taxes compared to pre-tax income 
(measured by TR-progressivity) could not compensate for a large decrease of the average 
tax rate over the period and bring the redistributive effect (measured by IR-progressivity) 
in 2004 to the level from 1997. The average tax rate, as can be seen from Table 215, fell 
by one third over the period. The reasons are twofold; one is the declining share of the tax 
14 Quantile p* , at which TR-progressivity reaches the maximum, divides the taxpayers into two groups: those 
whose rank is p < p* pay less than the average tax rate, and those whose rank is p > p* pay more than the average tax 
rate. The value of p* increased from 0.82 in 1997 to 0.86 in 2004.
15 Appendix C summarizes basic descriptive statistics of income, allowances and tax.218
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base in pre-tax income, due to increasing allowances and deductions, and the other, the 
declining tax-to-base ratio that stems from changes in marginal tax rates and definitions 
of tax brackets (see further for more details).
Table 2 PIT elements – shares in pre-tax income and concentrations
1997 2004
Whole
sample
Sample without 
pensioners
Whole
sample
Sample without 
pensioners
Share in pre-tax income
allowance (a) 46.1 36.9 54.3 44.3
deductions (d) 0.4 0.3 5.1 6.2
tax credits (c) 0.0 0.0
tax base (b) 53.5 62.7 40.6 49.5
net tax (t) 12.3 14.8 8.2 10.2
t / b 23.0 23.6 20.1 20.6
Gini / concentration coefficientsa
pre-tax income (GX) 0.440 0.414 0.454 0.429
post-tax income (GN) 0.402 0.378 0.424 0.398
allowance (CA) 0.160 0.154 0.220 0.198
deductions (CD) 0.578 0.494 0.634 0.499
tax base (CB) 0.681 0.566 0.744 0.626
gross tax (CG) 0.718 0.621 0.791 0.701
tax credit (CC) 0.886 0.877
net tax (CT) 0.718 0.621 0.791 0.701
a These are regular Gini and concentration coefficients; they are equivalent to S-Gini indices of 
inequality and concentration for ν = 2.
Table 3 shows the global S-indices of IR- and TR-progressivity obtained for ν-val-
ues ranging from 1.1 to 5. For all ν ≥ 1.5, IR-progressivity dominates in 1997, and for all 
ν TR-progressivity is larger in 2004. IR-progressivity is higher in 2004 for ν = 1.1, but 
the difference is not significant at the 5% level (α = 0.05).16, 17
Table 4 presents S-Gini indices of pre-tax income, GX (ν), which show that income in-
equality has unambiguously grown over the period.18 Blackorby-Donaldson indices show 
that the inequality-reducing power of the PIT system has weakened. These indices can be 
interpreted in the following way: for example, in 1997 the index for SDM with ν = 2 tells 
16 Bootstrap methodology described in Anderson et al (2003) is used to test statistical significance of the results. 
See Appendix B for details about this.
17 Reranking is relatively small in both year and reaches about 2% of IR-progressivity for a wide range of val-
ues of the ethical parameter.
18 For more on income inequality in Croatia, see Nestić (2005) and Čok and Urban (2006).219
I. Urban: Progressivity of personal income tax in Croatia: decomposition of tax base and rate effects
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (3), 207-231 (2006)
us that the actual system, due to its IR-progressivity, enabled 6.2% more (post-tax) wel-
fare than an equal-yield proportional tax. We can see that this ‘welfare premium from pro-
gression’ rises as the ethical parameter is increased. Looked at from a different angle, for 
the same after-tax welfare, the progressive tax system enables a higher tax revenue than 
the proportional system. For example, ask the following question: If SDM with ν = 2 in 
1997 wanted to apply proportionate tax and achieve same post-tax social welfare as the 
actual, what would be the tax rate? The answer is: 100% x [actual average tax rate minus 
 TRP (2)] = 14.8% - 5.2% = 9.6%.
Table 3 Indices of IR- and TR-progressivity
 IR (ν)  TR (ν)
ν 1997 2004
differencea
(2004-1997)
1997 2004
differencea
(2004-1997)
1.1 0.0101 0.0105 0.0004 0.0585 0.0925 0.0340*
1.5 0.0294 0.0271 -0.0023* 0.1695 0.2397 0.0702*
2.0 0.0361 0.0309 -0.0052* 0.2082 0.2726 0.0644*
3.0 0.0370 0.0291 -0.0079* 0.2134 0.2567 0.0433*
5.0 0.0319 0.0227 -0.0092* 0.1838 0.2004 0.0166*
a Differences significant at the 5% level (α = 0.05) are indicated by *.
Table 4 Indices of welfare premium and tax revenue premium
GX (ν)  BD (ν)  TRP (ν)
ν 1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004
1.1 0.0794 0.0853 0.0110 0.0115 0.0093 0.0103
1.5 0.2784 0.2917 0.0407 0.0383 0.0347 0.0344
2.0 0.4135 0.4286 0.0616 0.0541 0.0524 0.0486
3.0 0.5593 0.5762 0.0840 0.0687 0.0715 0.0617
5.0 0.6968 0.7154 0.1052 0.0798 0.0896 0.0716
3.4 Progressivity decomposition
Figure 3 shows the decomposition of IR-progressivity across quantiles of the pre-tax 
income distribution. First to state something about general relationship between the vari-
ous effects: the allowance effect is about 6-7 times more intensive than the rate effect on 
the median, but as we approach top quantiles the relative contributions of the allowance 
and rate effects converge to 50%. The deductions effect is invisible in 1997, but had in-
creased to negative 3% of overall IR-progressivity in 2004. Tax credit effect is negligi-
ble in 2004 due to its small share in pre-tax income, and therefore we ignore it in further 220
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analysis. Despite numerous changes in the PIT system during the period, its main redis-
tributive patterns remained the same, with allowances as the strongest progressivity en-
hancing element, followed by the rate structure. However, as already mentioned above, 
its redistributive power has weakened. The following analysis tries to explain how differ-
ent elements contributed to the declining redistributive effect.
Figure 3 IR-progressivity decomposition by percentile
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Three main changes in Croatian PIT happened between 1997 and 2004: a) personal 
allowance was doubled (while mean pre-tax income grew by 65%); b) rate structure be-
came steeper with highest (lowest) marginal tax rate changed from 35% to 45% (20% to 
15%); c) a number of deductions were introduced, all of them being income-elastic (i.e. 
they are more concentrated than pre-tax income). All these changes had different impacts 
on concentration and relative magnitudes of allowances, deductions and net tax, and conse-
quently, on IR-progressivity. Higher allowances and deductions eroded the tax base, which 
fell from 62.7% to 49.5% of pre-tax income, as can be seen in Table 2, almost half of this 
drop being attributable to deductions. The decrease of the tax base could have been com-
pensated by a corresponding rise of marginal tax rates, but this has not happened. More-
over, the opposite trend occurred: as Figure 4 shows, average tax rate as a function of the 
tax base (denoted as u(B)), is lower in 2004 for all amounts less than 325 thousand kuna. 
Only the 0.2% richest taxpayers have a tax base higher than this and although they con-
tribute 5.4% of the total tax base, an increase of their marginal tax rate could not compen-
sate for lower average rates at tax bases below 325 thousands kuna. As a final result, the 
average tax rate (t) fell from 0.148 to 0.102 or by 31%. 221
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Figure 4 Average and marginal tax rates as functions of tax base
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Relaxation of the fall in IR-progressivity due to a large decrease of the average tax rate 
could have come from three sources: lower concentration of allowances, higher share of 
allowances in pre-tax income (a), and more progressive (steeper) tax schedule19. The first 
two sources are actually conradictory: from Table 2 we can see that the concentration of 
allowances (CA) has increased, which is caused by a large increase of the ‘nominal’ amount 
of personal allowance: a larger number of people simply cannot use the whole amount to 
which they have right.20 In Figure 3 we see that the allowance effect in 1997 is smaller 
than in 2004 at all quantiles, and that the rate effect is smaller for all but the highest in-
come ranks. However, both effects fell by only 12% on average across the pre-tax income 
quantiles, compared to a 31% fall in the average tax rate. Thus, the increased share of al-
lowances in pre-tax income (a) and the increased progressivity of rate structure did com-
pensate for part of the IR-progressivity fall. Lastly, there is negative deductions effect that 
further prevents the PIT system in 2004 from achieving 1997 IR-progressivity.
We now turn to shares of allowance, rate structure, and deductions effects in S-indi-
ces of IR-progressivity, which are presented in Figure 5 for a wide range of ν-values, and 
obtained for both reduced and full samples (denoted respectively as ‘rs’ and ‘fs’ in the fig-
ure). We shall concentrate first on the results for the reduced samples. Two main factors 
of progressivity, the allowances and rate structure, have opposite trends as the ethical pa-
19 Tax schedule in 2004 indeed obtains significantly greater elasticity for all values of tax base (except on small 
interval of 31,000-36,000 kuna, where elasticity was slightly greater in 1997).
20 Suppose that persons P and Q have pre-tax incomes of $100 and $200. If ‘nominal’ allowance is set to $100, 
then both persons fully use it and the allowance is absolutely equally distributed. But, if ‘nominal’ allowance is 
increased to $150, then P still uses $100 and Q uses $150, and therefore concentration of allowances is increased.222
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rameter increases. The share of the allowance effect for both years is increasing in ν and 
at some point reaches the value 0.8, meaning that 80% of progressivity is attributed to al-
lowances. On the other hand, the share of the rate effect in progressivity increases from 
0.2 to 0.4 as we move to the left along the x-axis. To explain these trends we must remem-
ber that the majority of the rate effect is obtained at the upper quantiles of the distribution 
(Figure 3), to which S-indices with high values of ν give much less importance.
Why do we care about these shares estimated for a wide range of ethical parameter? 
For example, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) calculate the shares only for ν = 2 and 
compare the results for 15 countries. However, the choice of value  ν = 2 is no less ar-
bitrary and more self-evident than any other choice.21 Here, in case of Croatia we could 
choose ν = 3 and conclude that the allowance effect is key element in achieving progres-
sivity. Equally so, choosing ν = 1.5 we could well conclude that PIT is progressive due 
to the even mixture of allowance and rate effect. Therefore, Lambert (1999) suggests the 
use of S-Gini indices in international and intertemporal comparisons as a way in which 
“robustness of conclusions derived using the regular Gini-based (progressivity measures) 
can be tested”.
Figure 5   Shares of allowance, rate structure and deductions effects in overall
IR-progressivity, as functions of ν
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21 Duclos and Tabi (1995) limit their choice of ν to a maximum 4, based on the ‘leaky bucket experiment’, this 
leak reflecting “the feature that tax and benefit programmes often generate efficiency losses which are nevertheless 
tolerated because these programmes can enhance the equity of the income distribution making it less unequal”. For 
example, the maximum tolerable leak of transferring 1$ from the person whose individual rank is pj=2/3 in the income 
distribution to person whose rank is pi=1/3 amounts to 87.5 cents for SDM with ν = 4.223
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Another factor that can lead to misleading comparisons is population coverage. Fig-
ure 5 reveals that the shares of the effects in total IR-progressivity are significantly dif-
ferent if the full sample (one that includes pensioners) is analyzed. Here, we see that the 
allowance effect is far larger, and at the expense of the rate effect, while the share of the 
deductions effect is about twice as big. The supremacy of the allowance effect is due to 
pensioners’ high personal allowance, which results in only small percentage of pension-
ers actually facing a tax schedule.
3.5 Further analysis - simulation
From the findings above, we reach the conclusion that SDMs with different ethical 
considerations will value differently the contributions of PIT elements in achieving pro-
gressivity. Those with higher (lower) values of ethical parameter will attribute more rela-
tive importance to the allowance effect (rate effect).
One evident application of the knowledge about what makes a PIT progressive is re-
lated to tax reform. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) mention the case of an SDM who 
uses the rate structure to influence progressivity. If the current rate effect is low, then even 
a significant increase in the progressivity of the rate structure would not help to bring a 
desired increase in overall progressivity. Another interesting example is the introduction 
of a flat-rate PIT, accompanied by the abolition of all or many of the exemptions and de-
ductions. Based on our findings in respect of the Croatian PIT, we are tempted to con-
clude that the single rate system could achieve much of (if not even more than) the exist-
ing progressivity as defined by our S-indices. However, there are certain restraints to such 
conclusions, which the following exercise will highlight. 
Imagine that a current PIT system is replaced by a quite simple one with a single 
personal allowance, equal for all taxpayers, and with no other allowances or deductions. 
There is only one marginal rate, and the system has to be revenue-neutral. There is an un-
limited set of combinations of allowance and marginal rate that would satisfy the given 
condition, but we set a second condition: that the system must be  IR(ν)-neutral. We call 
this alternative tax scheme “unique allowance-single rate” (henceforth UASR) system 
in what follows. Thus, the IR-progressivity of the simulated system must be the same as 
of the actual one, for the chosen ν-value. It must be recalled that it is not the policy rec-
ommendation of this paper that policy makers should replace the actual system with this 
one; moreover, the modeled system is very simplistic (and rather unrealistic), but as such 
serves its main purpose, which is to offer a supplement to conclusions reached using pro-
gressivity decomposition formulas.22
Denote by η the amount of nominal personal allowance for each taxpayer.23 The S-
index of IR-regressivity of the allowance achieved with η is obtained by integrating in 
negative counterpart of (4)24:
22 Discussions about flat-rate PIT introduction in Croatia were rather sporadic. However, this exercise might 
provide some insights for SDM in other countries that might be contemplating such a move, or have already estab-
lished a flat-rate system.
23 The allowance of taxpayer i is thus Ai = η if Xi ≥ η and Ai = Xi if Xi < η.
24 Remember that the “regressivity” of allowance is equal to negative progressivity of allowance, ρA (p) = – A (p).224
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ρA
η ν () =ρ A
η p ()
0
1
∫ κ p () dp  (18)
Because there are no tax credits and deductions, and there is no rate structure either, 
the index of IR-progressivity of the flat-rate system,  IR,F (ν), will be equal to the allow-
ance effect. Thus, from (3a) and (18) we have that:
π
IR,F ν () =
t
F
1− t
F ρA
η ν ()  (19)
where tF is the average tax rate of the flat-rate system. Rearranging (19) and setting 
conditions  IR,F (ν) =  IR,A (ν) and tF = tA, where  IR,A (ν) and tA are respectively the IR-
progressivity and average tax rate of the actual system, we obtain (20), which calculates 
the index of regressivity of allowances, achieved with nominal allowance η*, at which 
the IR-progressivities of the flat and actual systems are the same:
ρA
η* ν () =
1− t
A
t
A π
IR,A ν ()  (20)
The simulation goes as follows: using the distribution of pre-tax incomes, we calcu-
late values of ρη
A   (ν) for a wide range of η -values and we then look for ρη
A  * (ν). The need-
ed single tax rate φ* is then obtained as φ* = tA / bη*, where bη* is ratio of the tax base to 
total pre-tax income when η = η*.
The simulation is done for the pre-tax income distribution of 2004, for several val-
ues of the ethical parameter. The rows of Table 5 present the unique allowance and single 
tax rate required for three IR-progressivity neutral UASR models, at ν = 1.5, ν = 2 and ν 
= 3, called M1-M3 respectively. For example, model M3 equalizes the IR-progressivity 
of the UASR system at ν = 3 with the IR-progressivity of the actual system obtained for 
the same ethical parameter.
Table 5 UASR models for 2004
Model Condition Unique 
allowance
(α*)
Flat tax
rate
(φ*)
IR-progress.
 IR (1.5)
IR-progress.
 IR (2)
IR-progress.
 IR (3)
M1  IR,F (1.5) =  IR,A (1.5) 31,590 0.2277 0.0271 0.0345 0.0361
M2  IR,F (2) =  IR,A (2) 27,960 0.2058 0.0238 0.0309 0.0333
M3  IR,F (3) =  IR,A (3) 23,480 0.1816 0.0195 0.0259 0.0291
Table 5 shows that the models with a lower value of the ethical parameter require a 
higher allowance (and, naturally, a higher single tax rate), and achieve unambiguously 
higher IR-progressivity than those with a higher value of the ethical parameter, as can also 225
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be seen from Figure 6. At the first sight, the conclusion that the SDM with lower value of ν 
will ask for more progressive tax than the SDM with higher ν seems to be contradictory. 
We have seen earlier that all SDM’s with ν > 1 are ‘progressivity lovers’ in sense that for 
all of them progressive tax delivers a welfare premium compared to an equal-yield propor-
tionate tax; they only differ in degree of this feeling, in the sense that the welfare premium 
increases in ν .The case shown in Table 5 is no exception:  IR (3) >  IR (2) >  IR (1.5) for 
all three models, M1-M3. The reason for an SDM with lower value ν asking for relatively 
more progressivity in a simulated system lies in his perception of the progressivity of the 
actual system. We have seen that an SDM with low (high) values of ν attributes greater 
relative significance to progressivity obtained at higher (lower) quantiles of pre-tax distri-
bution. The actual system achieves most of its progressivity at the highest quantiles, large-
ly thanks to progressive rate structure that, of course, does not exist in UASR models. The 
only way available way for an SDM with low ν to compensate for lack of progressive rates 
is to increase the personal allowance, and thus achieve more elastic tax function.
Figure 6   Progressivity of actual system and simulated UASR system in 2004
by percentile
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Lambert (2001) says that “popular analysis [of income tax reform] begins, and often 
ends, by identifying the pattern of gainers and losers when taxes are changed”.25 Here we 
end with the analysis of change in tax burdens caused by three UASR models. Figure 7 
presents changes in the average tax rate that would occur under these alternative tax sys-
tems compared to the actual system, with positive changes representing an increase in tax 
burden and vice versa. Again we face a contradictory result: due to larger personal allow-
ance, the model M1, based on lowest ν, creates tax cuts for the largest number of lower-
income people and the smallest number of people with highest incomes (and smallest cuts 
for this group), among all three models.
25 One such analysis is provided for current PIT system in Croatia by Urban (2006).226
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Figure 7   Difference between the average tax rate for simulated UASR system and 
actual system in 2004 by percentile
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4 Conclusion
This paper analyzed various redistributional aspects of Croatian personal income tax 
from 1997 to 2004. Progressivity was decomposed using the methodology proposed by 
Pfähler (1990) and further elaborated by Lambert (2001). The breakdowns reveal how dif-
ferent elements of the PIT system, that is, the rate structure, allowances, deductions and tax 
credits, contribute to the achievement of overall progressivity. It is shown that the patterns 
of progressivity, and the effects of the elements which cause it, vary over the quantiles of 
the pre-tax income distribution. Quantile analysis thus has an advantage over scalar meas-
ures, such as the standard Gini-based measures of income inequality (Gini coefficient), 
and of progressivity (Reynolds-Smolensky and Kakwani indices). However, in this paper 
scalar measures are also used, so-called S-indices, which have been purpose-designed in 
terms of single parameter Gini and concentration indices, where the parameter expresses 
the SDM’s ethical judgments. For different choices of the ethical parameter underpinning 
the S-indices, comparison of results obtained for different time periods (countries) will 
bring different results. Also, the conclusions about the relative contributions of PIT ele-
ments to progressivity are sensitive to the coverage of population that is analyzed.
The redistributive power of Croatian PIT fell over the period, thanks to the lower av-
erage tax rate, and in spite of the increased concentration of taxes as compared to the ine-
quality of pre-tax income. On average, the largest share of progressivity can be attributed 
to allowances, while the rate structure is more important at the upper quantiles. Deduc-
tions, as in other countries, have a negative contribution to progressivity. Tax credits are 
a negligible element of the Croatian personal income tax system.
The applicability of this kind of analysis was recognized by Wagstaff and van Door-
slaer (2001), who calculated and compared progressivity decompositions of PIT systems 
in 15 OECD countries. For a country planning a tax reform, it is important to know how 227
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progressivity is achieved in the current system. Based on that, some recommendations 
can be given on possible paths for reform. It is shown that a simple flat-rate revenue-neu-
tral system could preserve progressivity. Parameters of this system, allowance and single 
rate, would depend upon the ethical stance of the SDMs: those relatively less (more) fa-
vorably inclined to the lower tail of the pre-tax income distribution will choose a higher 
(lower) allowance and a higher (lower) single tax rate.
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APPENDIX
A) S-Gini social welfare function
S-Gini social welfare function aggregates individual incomes in the following way:
W ν () = Qp () ω p,ν ()
0
1
∫ dp
 
(21)
where ω (p,ν) is a weighting scheme with single-parameter ν. Figure A1 illustrates ω (p,ν)
for several values of the ethical parameter ν. For ν = 1 the weights are equal to 1 for all 
individuals, and in this case welfare is identical to per capita income, a common aggre-
gate measure of society’s living standard. For ν > 1 weights are decreasing in p, such that 
ω (p = 0,ν) = ν and ω (p = 1,ν) = 0. Also observe that  ω p,ν ()
0
1
∫ dp = 1, i.e. the weights 
sum up to 1. As Duclos and Araar (2006) show, the S-Gini social welfare function can 
also be expressed using Lorenz curve and weighting scheme κ p;ρ () , where μ is the av-
erage actual income:
 
W ν () =μ Lp () κ p,ν ()
0
1
∫ dp  (22)
Suppose that an SDM is aiming to achieve a purely egalitarian society (i.e. one in 
which all people have the same income). This would be done by progressive taxation of 
rich and transfers to poor. In this process, people would certainly lose part of their incen-
tive to earn income and total income would fall below the current. Let ξ be the income of 
each individual in an egalitarian society in which the welfare would be the same as actual 
(so-called equally distributed equivalent, EDE), and μ–ξ is the loss of income per capita 
due to loss of earning incentives. What part of the total income would an SDM be ready 
to sacrifice to achieve his goal? The answer is given by index of income inequality, I:
I =
μ−ξ
μ
= 1−
ξ
μ
 (23)229
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Figure A1 Weights for S-Gini social welfare function
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In our specific case of S-Gini social welfare function, we have that ξ = W(ν) and
I = G(ν), where G(ν) is the S-Gini index of income inequality, defined in section 2:
G ν () = 1−
W ν ()
μ
 (24)
B) Statistical inference
As the values of all indicators are estimated from samples, we need to check their sta-
tistical significance. Anderson et al (2003) used the following bootstrap sampling proce-
dure to estimate confidence intervals for the Suits index. There are three stages of sam-
pling; we name the resulting samples the 1st, 2nd and 3rd stage samples. The first stage is 
the drawing of a representative sample from the population; we assume this has already 
been done. Using the data from the original or 1st stage sample, estimates of various in-
dicators are obtained. Call  ˆ V1 and  ˆ V2 the estimates of one such indicator in periods 1 and 
2, and  ˆ D = ˆ V1– ˆ V2. their difference. From the original sample, a certain number N of 2nd 
stage samples, of the same size as the original sample, are drawn randomly with replace-
ment. Vectors v
1* = v1
1* ,...,vN
1* ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦  and v
2* = v1
2*,...,vN
2* ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ contain bootstrap replications 
of the desired measure for each of these N samples in periods 1 and 2. Let the difference 
between the values in the two periods be d* = v1* – v2*. The bootstrap standard error of 
ˆ D is obtained as:
σ=
1
N −1
di
* − d
* () i=1
N ∑
2
 (25)230
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where d
* =
1
N
d j
*
j=1
N ∑ .  In the third stage, from each of the N samples, M new sam-
ples are drawn randomly with replacement, all of the same size as the original sample. Let 
 
vi
1** = vi,1
1** ,...,vi,M
1** ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ and 
 
vi
2** = vi,1
2**,...,vi,M
2** ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦  be the vectors of M bootstrap replications 
of the desired measure obtained, for samples drawn from ith 2nd stage sample, in periods 
1 and 2, and let di
** = vi
1** − vi
2** = di,1
**,...,di,M
** ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ be their difference. Then the bootstrap 
standard error for each of the 2nd stage samples (i=1…N) is equal to:
σi
* =
1
M −1
di,j
** − di
** () j=1
M ∑
2  (26)
where di
** =
1
M
di,j
**
j=1
M ∑ . The bootstrap t-statistic for each of the 2nd stage samples 
is equal to ti = di
* − D () / σi
* . Let tα and t1−α be the α-th and (1−α)-th quantiles of the vec-
tor t = [t1, ..., tN]. Then the 100 x (1−α)-percent confidence interval for D is given by [ ˆ D–
t1–ασ ˆ    , ˆ D–tασ ˆ    ]. The null hypothesis H0 : D = 0 can be rejected in favor of H1 : D = / 0 only if 
lower and upper bound of the confidence interval both have the same sign. Note that the 
methodology requires that N be at least 1,000 and M at least 25.231
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C) Descriptive statistics of income, allowances and tax 
1997 2004
Whole
sample
Sample 
without 
pensioners
Whole
sample
Sample 
without 
pensioners
Total pre-tax incomea
49,689 40,129 96,957 70,931
  Wages and salaries 35,065 35,065 63,003 63,003
 Pensions 9,007 0 23,209 0
  Self-employment income 3,150 3,105 5,035 4,903
  Income from part-time and contractual work 1,875 1,549 2,461 2,048
 Rental  income 592 417 1,624 1,051
 Dividends 0 0 1,722 0
 PIT 6,101 5,938 7,916 7,219
Pre-tax incomeb
 mean 24,226 29,269 37,294 45,685
 standard  deviation 24,773 27,722 52,616 51,428
 25th percentile 10,276 13,733 15,605 20,451
 median 17,711 23,932 27,061 36,635
 75th percentile 31,498 37,446 47,405 58,929
Post-tax income
 mean 21,251 24,938 34,249 41,035
 standard  deviation 18,513 20,291 41,773 38,693
 25th percentile 10,106 13,012 15,520 20,098
 median 16,867 21,616 26,510 34,782
 75th percentile 27,989 32,559 44,654 54,249
Personal allowance
 mean 11,178 10,805 20,258 20,230
 standard  deviation 5,749 5,433 11,361 11,504
Other allowances
 mean 94 99 1,885 2,843
 standardna  devijacija 1,583 1,834 10,865 13,732
Tax base
 mean 12,953 18,365 15,150 22,612
 standard  deviation 23,382 26,000 46,882 43,597
Gross tax
 mean 94 99 3,050 4,654
 standard  deviation 6,894 7,997 12,716 14,778
Tax credits
 mean 0 0 5 5
 standardna  devijacija 0 0 230 270
Net tax
 mean 2,974 4,331 3,045 4,649
 standard  deviation 6,894 7,997 12,709 14,770
a million kuna; b in kuna